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INTRODUCTION
For many years economic theorists have argued the potential shortcom
ings of rate of return regulation (RORR), particularly with regard to its ap
plication to public utilities. The failings of RORR became more than a mat
ter of academic speculation during the 1970s and 1980s. Successive waves of
shocks (capital costs, fuel costs, environmental protection, nuclear power
cost overruns, and so on) seemed to leave the process lurching from one
crisis to another with vocal dissatisfaction on the part of all participants:
firms, consumers, regulators, shareholders and bondholders.
In such an environment, it should be no surprise that there is great in
terest in alternatives to RORR. In particular, it has been noted that RO RR is
premised upon an information environment in which regulators are
presumed to have an incredibly rich knowledge of both econ om ic costs and
demand schedules. In fact, the environment is information sparse and
regulators are typically forced to react to information on accounting costs
transmitted to them by the regulated firms. Regulators' knowledge of de
mand consists of historical (and perhaps irrelevant) observations and of im
perfect statistical projections about future consumer behavior. Thus, the
search for alternatives to RORR has, among other things, looked for
regulatory processes that do not require such strong information re
quirements for achievement of optimal outcomes. Reducing the information
requirements suggests a decentralization of decision-making. Yet if there is a
valid economic rationale for regulation (such as the existence of an un
contestable natural monopoly), then decentralizing the process may leave
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profit maximizing firms with the incentive and the discretion to choose inef
ficient outcomes. Therefore, an even narrower class of alternatives to
RORR will be considered here: decentralized regulatory proccesses
(mechanisms) which make the economically efficient prices and quantities
the result of profit maximizing decisions by the regulated firm. We shall
refer to this class of processes as "incentive regulation."
While several such processes have been developed by economists there
has not been, to understate the point, a flood of state regulatory commis
sions jumping on the incentive regulation bandwagon. This is not only un
surprising, it is quite rational for any single regulatory agency. For all of its
shortcomings, RORR holds a unique position as the extant regulatory pro
cess of virtually every municipal and state utility regulatory agency in the
country. As the regulatory process in situ, economic and political agents at
all levels have substantial amounts of economic, financial, political, and
human capital in place which is predicated upon the existence of RORR.
With so much at stake, one would expect regulators to move very cautious
ly before scrapping RORR and instituting an alternative regulatory process
which has existed only on the pages of an academic journal.
While the institutional inertia described above is explicable, it leads to a
"Catch-22" for proposals to replace RO RR. No regulator will seriously con
sider an alternative to RORR without some documentation of its perfor
mance properties; but this conservatism means that alternative processes do
not get tried. This creates a bias in favor of the incumbent regulatory in
stitution, whose status may be due more to historical accident than to in
herent superiority.
What we intend for this paper is to present a case study to make two
points. First, the technique of laboratory experimental economic analysis
can provide useful information about the performance features of alter
native regulatory institutions and thus help to break the inertia which
favors RORR by default. Second, the fear on the part of "practical-minded"
participants in the regulatory arena that what "works" in economic theory
may not "work" in practice is not unfounded. Specifically, we report on
research which is part of a larger inquiry into regulatory and deregulatory
alternatives to RORR conducted for the Arizona Corporation Commission.
As a case study, we will present and compare theoretical and experimental
analyses of proposed incentive regulatory mechanisms. We will compare
the behavior of flesh and blood humans to the theoretically optimal
behavior predicted by the theory. And, we will show how the divergence of
the two led to fruitful new directions for research.
THE EVOLUTION OF THEORIES
OF INCENTIVE REGULATION
The first incentive mechanism that we will discuss is the Loeb-Magat
(LM) mechanism. The approach of Loeb-Magat [1979] was to extend the
concept of a dominant-strategy revelation mechanism [Groves and Loeb,
1975] to the context of a regulatory authority facing a monpoly firm. Under
the LM mechanism the firm chooses its own price and the regulatory agency
pays the utility a subsidy equal to the Marshallian consumer surplus at the
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chosen price. B oth the regulator an d the firm are assumed to know the de
mand curve for the firm's product. In addition the firm, but not the
regulator, is assumed to know the firm's marginal cost curve.
The properties of the LM mechanism can be developed with Figure 1 as
follows. D is the demand curve for the firm's output and MC is its marginal
cost curve. These "curves” are linear in the figure, but linearity is not essen
tial to the argument. MC is decreasing in the figure, as for a decreasingaverage-cost natural monopoly, but that is also not essential to the proper
ties of the LM mechanism. Suppose the firm chooses the efficient price, p*,
where the demand and marginal cost curves intersect. The firm will collect
revenue from selling quantity q* at price p* equal to p *q *. In Figure 1, p*q*
revenue is the rectangular area Oq*Ap*. The subsidy equal to the entire
consumer surplus for quantity q* is the area under the demand curve out to
q*, excluding the revenue rectangle. It is the area p*AB. The firm's total
variable cost of producing quantity q* is the area under its marginal cost
curve out to q *, which in the figure is area Oq*AC. Thus the firm's profit is
area CAB minus its fixed cost of production. If the firm chooses some other
price, such as p , its revenue will be Oq Ep ; its subsidy will be p EB; and its
variable cost will be Oq FC. Thus by choosing a price p, above p*, the firm's
profits would be decreased by an amount equal to area FAE.
The preceding discussion makes clear why the LM mechanism provides
an incentive for the regulated firm to choose the efficient price defined by

FIGURE 1
The L-M Mechanism
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»
q

q
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the intersection of its demand and marginal cost curves. In addition to its in
centive for allocative efficiency, the LM mechanism also provides an incen
tive for cost efficiency, as can be seen by the following. Suppose that by the
elimination of waste, or through innovation, the firm is able to reduce its
costs. A reduction in fixed cost will not affect either the size of the subsidy
or the profit-maximizing price; hence it will increase the firm's profits by the
full amount of the cost reduction. Alternatively, a reduction in marginal
cost from, say, MC to MC in Figure 1 will decrease the profit-maximizing
price from p* to p and increase profits by an amount equal to area GHAC.
In either case, under the LM mechanism the firm continues to reap a benefit
from cost reduction indefinitely; whereas under RORR the firm's rewards
for cost reduction are typically rescinded at the next rate proceeding.
Therefore, the LM mechanism provides a stronger incentive for cost effi
ciency than does RORR.
Some may object to the preceding version of the LM mechanism because
the subsidy to the firm is equal in size to all the gains from exchange. Loeb
and Magat suggested two possible extensions of their mechanism to reduce
the size of the subsidy; (a) a lump sum tax; and (b) auctioning the franchise.
A lump sum tax in an amount that did not exceed the firm's maximum after
subsidy profits (area CAB in Figure 1 minus fixed cost) would not cause the
profit-maximizing price to deviate from the price, p*. Alternatively, max
imum after-subsidy profits would be the value of an exclusive franchise.
Auctioning the franchise would make it possible for the regulatory authori
ty to recapture part of the profits and thus reduce the next subsidy payment.
In addition, we have described a "modified Loeb-Magat" (MLM)
mechanism, which reduces the subsidy and the informational requirements
for the regulator, but still requires the regulator to know part of the firm's
demand curve [Block, et al., 1985].
Both the size of the subsidy and the informational requirements for run
ning a mechanism can be further reduced if the mechanism introduced by
Finsinger-Vogelsang [1981] is used instead of the MLM mechanism as a
replacement for RORR. The subsidy formula for the Finsinger-Vogelsang
(FV) mechanism involves an adjustment process based on observed market
prices and quantities, as follows. Let pr be the extant market price when the
FV mechanism is applied to the firm. Beginning with period 0 under the FV
mechanism, the firm can choose its price for each time period. The chosen
price at time period t is pt, t = 0, 1, 2, ... This price can vary from one
period to another but must be constant within a time period. The firm must
supply the entire quantity, qt, that is demanded at its chosen price in each
time period. Beginning with extant price and quantity, (pr, qr), if the firm
chooses price pg in period 0 then its subsidy is

50 = qr lpr - Pol

(!)

Note that if pg = pr then the subsidy is zero. If pg > pr then the "subsidy" is
negative; that is, the firm is taxed if it raises its price. If pg < pr then the firm
receives a positive subsidy. One such subsidy for period 0 is represented by
area A in Figure 2. The subsidy in time period 1 is

51 = Sg + qo lPo -Pil

(2)
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If p i < pq then S } > Sg. If P i < Po < Pr t^,en ^ i > S q > 0. One such subsidy
for period 1 is given by area A plus area B in Figure 2. If P2 < P i < Po < Pr
then the subsidy for period 2 is given by area A plus area B plus area C in
the figure. The subsidy formula for any time t = 0, 1, 2, ... can be written
as
St = St - l + q t - l [ P t - l - P t l

(3)

using the convention that S _ i = 0, q _ i = qr , and p _ j = pr .
An alternative way of writing subsidy formula (3) is
st =

t
£ qT- l ( P r - l - P r l
7 = 0

(3')

= qr [Pr - Pol + qo tpo - Pil + qi Ip i - qzl +

+ q t-ilp t-i - Ptl

Statement (3') makes clear an important property of the FV mechanism: if
the firm ever raises its price (pT > pT_ i, for some t ) it is penalized in the cur
rent and in all later periods by a negative term in the subsidy formula (qT_ i
[pT_ l - p T] < 0). Figure 2 makes clear another important property of the FV
mechanism: for any given reduction in price (say, from pr to P2 ), the sub
sidy paid under the FV mechanism will be less than the subsidy paid under
the LM mechanism (because the former excludes the "stairstep” areas).
/N

FIGURE 2
Finsinger-Vogelsang Mechanism
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Further insight into the incentive properties of the FV mechanism can be
gained from Figure 3. Let pr and qr be the extant price and quantity when
the FV mechanism is applied to the firm. The firm is then free to choose pq .
Consider a time 0 price that is less than pr (say pg) and an alternative time 0
price that is greater than pr (say pg). What are the implications for profits in
time 0 of these alternative time 0 prices? Sales revenue from selling quantity
qr at price pr is given by area 0 qr A pr in Figure 3. Sales revenue from sell
ing quantity qg at price pg is given by area 0 qg B pg in Figure 3. These two
areas both contain the area OqrCpQ; hence the change in sales revenue
from reducing the price in time period 0 from pr to pgis given by area qr qg
B C less area pgCApr . But the subsidy is given by area pg CApr . Thus the
change in sales revenue plus subsidy from reducing the price from pr to pg is
the positive amount given by area qr qgBC. The increase in quantity from
qr to qg, which is required to supply the increase in quantity demanded
following the price decrease, increases cost by an amount given by area
qr qgEF. Since this area is smaller than area qr qgBC, decreasing the price
from pr to pgin period 0 would increase profits in p eriod 0.

FIGURE 3
Incentive Properties of the FV Mechanism
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Next, consider the time 0 profit implications of increasing the price from
pr to pq in time period 0. Sales revenue from selling quantity qg at price pg
is given by area 0 qg G pg in Figure 3. Since sales revenue of selling quantity
qr at price pr is given by area 0 qr A pr, the change in sales revenue from in
creasing the price from pr to pg is given by area pr HG pg less area qg qr AH.
But the subsidy given by statement (1) for the price increase is the negative
amount given by minus one times area pr A I pg. Thus the change in sales
revenue plus subsidy in period 0 from increasing the price from pr to pg is
the negative amount given by minus one times (area HAIG plus area qg qr
AH), which is minus one times area qgqrIG. The reduction in quantity from
qr to qg will decrease costs by an amount given by area qgqrFJ. Therefore,
increasing price from pr to $g would decrease profits in time period 0 by an
amount given by area JF1G. Furthermore, similar reasoning would show
that any price increase (from pr to any higher price) would reduce time 0
profits. Therefore, since we have shown that some price decreases (for ex
ample, from pr to pg) would increase time 0 profits, we conclude that the
FV mechanism would cause the firm to decrease price in time 0 if its objec
tive were to maximize time 0 profits.
Next, suppose that the firm's objective is to choose pg and <p\ so as to
maximize the present (time period 0) discounted value of profits for periods
0 and 1. Then in choosing pg, the firm would need to be concerned with the
effect of that choice on profits in period 1 in addition to its effect on profits
in period 0. Figure 4 yields some insight into this question. This figure in
cludes three alternative possible prices for period 0, pg, pg, and pg. Let us
take p i as given and consider the implications for the period 1 subsidy of
the alternative period 0 prices. However, first note that p j is taken to be less
than all of the alternative period 0 prices. The reason for this is essentially
the same reasoning we used to show that time 0 profits can be increased by
choosing pg < pr would imply that time 1 profits can be increased by choos
ing P i < P0Now consider the effect on the period 1 subsidy, S j, of choosing pg to be
alternatively pg, pg,or pg. If pg = pg then statements (1) and (2) tell us that
S i = S i(p r, pg, p i) is given by area p i A B pg in Figure 4. Alternatively, if
P0 = P0 *hen statements (1) and (2) imply that S i = S i(p r, pg, P i) is given
by area pg CB pr plus area p i EF pg. Thus choosing”pg rather than pg in
creases S i by an amount given by area AEFC. Since by previous reasoning
we know that choosing pg rather than pg also increases period 0 profits, we
are assured that the price sequence pr, pg, P i dominates the sequence pr,
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PQ, P i- Next suppose p0 = pq . In that case, statements (1) and (2) imply
that S i = S i (pr, pq , P i ) is the amount given by area pq G B pr plus area pi
H I p0 . Therefore, the relative sizes of S i (pr, p0 , P i) and S i (pr, p0 , P i) are
determined by the relative sizes of areas GJFC and EHIJ in Figure 4. There
fore, in choosing pq as part of a sequence of profit-maximizing prices, pq,
Pi/ P2' ••:/ the i ‘rm would need to take account of the effect of its choice of
P q on S i, and therefore on profits in all periods subsequent to period 0, as
well as the effect on period 0 profits. Because of this linkage across time
periods, we cannot use a graphical approach to derive all of the properties
of a profit-maximizing price sequence under the FV mechanism. These
properties are derived by more advanced methods in an appendix to Block,
et al. [1985]. It is there demonstrated that, for a firm regulated by FV, a se
quence of prices that maximizes the present discounted value of profits is:
(a) decreasing over time (p^ _j_i < pj for all t); and (b) convergent to the effi
cient price determined by the intersection of the demand and marginal cost
curves.

FIGURE 4
Intertemporal Linkage of the FV Price
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In summary, the FV mechanism appears to have three desirable proper
ties:
1.

It does not require the regulator to know the firm's cost or demand
curves;

2.

It requires a smaller subsidy than the LM mechanism;

3.

The profit-maximizing path of prices for an FV-regulated firm is
monotonically decreasing, converging towards the fully efficient
price-output combination determined by the intersection of the de
mand and marginal cost curves.
EXPERIMENTAL TESTS OF THE
TW O INCENTIVE MECHANISMS

The previous section traced the theoretical evolution of the FV
mechanism and discussed its desirable properties. What we intend to
demonstrate here is that laboratory experimental economic analysis can
provide useful policy-oriented information that is distinct from the con
tributions of economic theory. Specifically, we will report on a series of
laboratory experimental processes designed to test the operation of the FV
mechanism in light of the theoretical prediction that it will achieve efficient
market outcomes. Because the FV mechanism can be viewed as a lowinformation-requirement, iterative approximation to the LM mechanism, a
useful benchmark for this investigation is the behavior of the LM process in
our laboratory environment.
In a previous study, Harrison and McKee [1985] have demonstrated in a
laboratory setting that the LM mechanism behaves substantially as
predicted. Our first task was to check to see if the earlier LM results would
be replicated in our own environment. First, the economic environment of
all of our incentive mechanism experiments is displayed in Figure 5. Notice
that the induced demand and cost conditions create a classic "natural
monopoly" market. The efficient (marginal cost pricing) outcome is for
quantity to equal twelve units. In a competitive market, twelve units would
be a profit maximizing quantity for the seller for any price in the range
[$2.80, $2.94]. The standard monopoly market predictions are for Pj^ =
$5.70 and Qp^ = 5 units. "Average cost" pricing (which captures the spirit
of RORR) would yield P ^ = $4.28,

= 8. In the experiments reported

below, the regulated firm will, because of the subsidy functions, have equal
incentives to choose any price which supports the competitive 12 units of
output. Therefore, we will use an expanded notion of a "competitive" price,
namely the range of prices which will cause buyers to purchase the efficient
12 units of output. This range, to be denoted CE* on the charts, is [$2.21,
$2.97],
All of these experiments were conducted as "posted offer" markets (see
Ketcham, Smith, and Williams [1984]) which exhibit many of the features
of a retail market for a non-storable commodity (such as electricity).
Whereas each market had one seller (the regulated monopolist), the buyer
behavior was "simulated" according to the parameters of the demand curve
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to capture the concept of a very large number of buyers, no one of which
believes that he can influence the seller's price. A more technical discussion
of the experimental procedures and a copy of the instructions are contained
in the appendix to this paper.

FIGURE 5
S/Q
Demand

Quantity

Using these economic cost and demand conditions, we conducted four ex
periments using the LM process. The results of these experiments are
displayed in Figure 6. As can be seen, the LM process works well, just as
had been found previously by Harrison and McKee. On average it took our
participants only 8 periods to converge to the efficient outcome (where con
vergence is defined as a 5-period repetition). In only one case in one period
did the outcome stray from the efficient quantity once convergence had oc
curred.
O f course, this laboratory version of LM exhibits the two practical im
plementation limitations noted in the LM theory. The regulator must know
the demand curve; and, at the efficient output level, subsidies from the
'government” will be large, at least 38 percent of total revenue in this par
ticular design. The FV mechanism on the other hand, is an attempt to
approximate the LM process without the regulator having to know the de
mand curve. Whether the firm must itself know the demand curve is am
biguous in the FV exposition, so we chose to test the mechanism both ways.
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FIGURE 6 (continued)
LM Mechanism
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The results of our FV series are a perfect example of how laboratory ex
perimental tests of proposed regulatory institutions can be invaluable in
public policy analysis. The theory states that this mechanism's optimal path
will converge to the efficient outcome (in this case, an output of 12 units).
But what happens if the firm errs, and gets off the optimal path? As
Seagraves [1984] has noted, there is the possibility of such "cycles" adverse
ly affecting the firm's profits. In fact, subject bankruptcy was a robust oc
currence in our tests of the FV mechanism. Consider Figure 7. In experiment
FV-1, the market behavior was virtually identical to that in the LM ex
periments. However, in FV-2, the seller raised his price to $4.80 and then
dropped it too quickly, becoming bankrupt. At this point, we cancelled his
debts and went over with him step-by-step the path to his bankruptcy.
Then, we told him that we would not cancel his debts again, but that we
would be happy at any point to explain in advance the consequences of any
decision he might want to make. Nevertheless, this seller again went
bankrupt with a "Seagraves-cycle" in periods 10-11.
For the next experiment, FV-3, we announced, in advance, that periods
1-3 were "trials," not actual payment periods. The participant was free to
start afresh in period 4. This seller also would have been bankrupt by period
3. We explained his losses step-by-step, and started the experiment "for
real" in period 4. This seller avoided bankruptcy in the rest of the experi
ment but d id not con verge to efficient outcomes.
Finally, in FV-4 we examined the most limited information case in which
neither the firm n or the regulator knows the demand curve in advance. De
mand is revealed only by the sequential behavior of buyers. This market,
FV-4, did not converge to efficient outcomes before the seller went bankrupt
in period 17.
Thus, even though the FV mechanism has theoretically desirable optimal
convergence properties, it is a mechanism which is permanently "unforgiv
ing" of errors. In our laboratory markets, this feature proved to be impor
tant, with three of four sellers going bankrupt because of errors off the
theoretically optimal path.
THE RESULTS AS A CASE STUDY
As might be expected, the undesirable behavioral properties evidenced by
the laboratory FV mechanism weighed heavily in our decision to recom
mend against further consideration of the FV process as a practical alter
native regulatory process. (However, as discussed below, it did not end our
consideration of other incentive regulatory mechanisms.) What we wish to
explore here is how the research program we have described illustrates the
contributions of laboratory experimental techniques to questions of the
design of public policy.
Before the FV experiments were begun we had completed the derivation
of a well-defined theory of the operation of the institution. Smith [1982] (us
ing a term suggested by Kaplan) classifies as nomothetic those experiments
which are designed to establish expected regularities of human behavior and
which are based upon well-defined hypotheses.1 An oft-heard question is "if
you have proven the theory (i.e. if its internal logic is correct) what is there

FIGURE 7
FV Mechanism
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FV1

Laboratory Market Research

FV2

In c e n tiv e R e g u la tio n

FIGURE 7 (continued)
FV Mechanism
$6.00
Pm

FV3

P ac

$4.00

X»
• •

•

PCE

$ 2.00
market period

» «» «
20

10

30

$6.00
Pm

FV4

Pac

$4.00
•

• •

Pce

$ 2.00

10
X

20

indicates seller bankruptcy

30

10

20

30

135

market period

136

Laboratory Market Research

to test?" Or, put another way, there is a tendency to reject the usefulness of
laboratory experimental tests of any logically consistent theory because
either: a) the results are consistent with (do not falsify) the theory, so that
the result was "obvious and expected;" or b) the results are not consistent
with (do falsify) the theory, which means there must be something wrong
with the experiment (that is to say, the experiment did not correctly capture
all of the assumptions, because the assumptions logically imply the
"correct" results).
The arguments stated above are invalid because they fail to distinguish
between the different levels of economic theories. At one level is the core
theory (or theorem or proposition) which is "proven" by its internal logical
consistency. At another level is the operation alized theory which is pur
ported to have interesting predictive power in an actual economic environ
ment. The argument that the core theory (theorem, proposition) is useful in
a predictive context draws upon a constellation of meta-assumptions which
connect the core theory to the operationalization. Isaac [1983] has argued
that for the typical economic theories which appear in applied contexts,
such as regulatory policy, there are at least three crucial requirements of
operationalization which could lead a logically correct theory to be a poor
predictor of the behavior of economic agents. First, the theory may fail to
specify some important feature of the economic environment (such as the
nature of the trading institution, the information position of the par
ticipants, and so on). Secondly, the operationalization of a core theory re
quires assumptions to be made about unobservable characteristics of
economic agents. Examples of such (implicit or explicit) assumptions about
individual economic agents are: that they are or are not perfect optimizers,
that they are or are not risk neutral, and so on. Also, the prediction of the
core theory may depend upon assumptions about group interaction. These
assumptions are usually referred to as the equilibrium or solution concepts
of the theory: e.g. Nash equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, etc. The opera
tionalization of the theory requires an answer to the question, "to what
group of real economic agents is the theory expected to apply?" This is not a
trivial question given that such individual characteristics as optimizing
skills and risk attitudes, and such group attributes as tendencies to act in
non-cooperative Nash fashion, are inherently unobservable. Finally, opera
tionalizing the theory requires specifying the theory's predictions, and this
may generate ambiguities that are not apparent in the core theory.
In the framework described above, it is easy to see that a logically correct
core theory can generate interesting operationalizations which are
falsifiable. Therefore, tests of such operationalized theories are informative
whether the results are falsifying or non-falsifying. If the results of a test of
an operationalized theory are consistent with the theory, then confidence in
the predictive usefulness of the core theory is increased and further
theoretical and empirical work can address questions about how robust the
positive results will be. (Smith [1982] refers to this process as searching for
the boundaries of falsification.) If the results of the tests are falsifying, then
the burden of proof shifts against the policy usefulness of the core theory.
Further work can include new theoretical work at the core level and/or tests
of different operationalizations of the same core theory.
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The incentive regulation research program provides a good example of
the methodological process just described. The FV theory is somewhat
vague as to precisely how much information the regulated monopolists
have about their own demand; so we chose two different operationaliza
tions. In one case the sellers began the experiment with a complete demand
schedule, in the other, only a single point was revealed at the start. The FV
theory is one of intertemporally optimizing economic agents. We had to ask
for what category of economic agents should the FV process reasonably be
expected to behave in the manner predicted? Our interpretation was that
the core theory contained no implication that it should be applied to one
group of people as opposed to another, so long as all were reasonably in
telligent, literate adults. We decided to draw from a subject pool of Univer
sity of Arizona students who were upperclass undergraduate or graduate
students in business or computer science and thus were not merely literate,
English-speaking adults but were also persons with the type of advanced
training one would expect to find among utility executives.
Thus operationalized, the laboratory FV mechanism failed to achieve the
predicted outcomes. The apparent reason for this failure is twofold: i) the
difficulty for economic agents of calculating the optimal price path; and ii)
the incentives against getting back on the optimal path once a mistake has
been made. We do n ot claim that our results p rov e that similar problems
would necessarily occur if a field version of FV were operationalized with
utility managers. What we do argue is that we have shown that the problem
of non-optimal behavior off the optimal path is more than a theoretical
curiosity. Three of our four monopolists were caught in the profit-destroy
ing cycles. These results greatly lowered our confidence in the FV process.
As mentioned, useful policy inquiry can continue after negative ex
perimental results. In the incentive regulation program, we moved to the
construction of a new regulatory mechanism which (we hoped) would
avoid the undesirable behavioral properties which we had seen in the FV
process. The theoretical development and laboratory testing of the resulting
"Arizona" mechanism are described in greater detail in Block, et al. [1985].
SUMMARY
Results from a laboratory experimental series designed to test a proposed
alternative process for utility regulation have been presented as a case study
of the usefulness of experimental inquiry. Laboratory experiments are not
the only form of testing. They are complementary to field empirical tech
niques in analyses of alternative regulatory institutions. The clear advan
tages of laboratory economic experiments include knowledge and control
over the economic environment, well defined predictions in that environ
ment, replicability, and low direct and opportunity costs of creating and
comparing different allocative institutions. (See Cox, Isaac, and Smith
[1983] for a more detailed discussion of these advantages in the context of
exploring the properties of alternative procedures for auctioning oil leases.)
Likewise, there are limitations to the applicability of laboratory tests. Ex
perimentation would not be particularly well suited for estimating popula
tion parameters, and, as we have stressed, falsifying and non-falsifying
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results in the laboratory do not prove that identical results would occur in
the field. Nevertheless, in our research on alternative regulatory processes,
laboratory experiments were invaluable in shaping our recommendations
against the adoption of a specific regulatory mechanism.

NOTE
'The usefulness of laboratory economic experiments is not confined to the category of
nomothetic experiments in which a well developed formal theory exists before the experiments
are conducted. A second category of experiments is that which Smith [1982] has described as
"heuristic", in which the experiments begin with informal conjectures about the operation of
one or more allocative institutions. Some public policy-related examples of heuristic ex
periments are detailed in Isaac (19831.

REFERENCES
Block, M ., J. Cox, M. Isaac, D. Pingry, S. Rassenti, and V. Smith, "Alternatives to Rate of
Return Regulation: A Final Report for the Arizona Corporation Commission," Mimeo,
University of Arizona (1985).
Cox, J., M. Isaac, and V. Smith, "OCS Leasing and Auctions: Incentives and the Performance
of Alternative Bidding Institutions," Supreme Court Econom ic Review (1983), pp. 43-87.
Finsinger, J. and I. Vogelsang, "Alternative Institutional Frameworks for Price Incentive
Mechanisms," K yklos (1981), pp. 388-404.
Groves, T. and M. Loeb, "Incentives and Public Inputs," Journal o f Public Economics (1975),
pp. 211-226.
Harrison, G. and M. McKee, "Monopoly Behavior, Decentralized Regulation, and Con
testable Markets: An Experimental Evaluation," Rand Journal o f Economics, forthcoming
(1985).
Isaac, M., "Laboratory Experimental Economics As a Tool in Public Policy Analysis," Social
Science Journal (1983), pp. 45-58.
Ketcham, J., V. Smith, and A. Williams, "A Comparison of Posted Offer and Double Auction
Pricing Institutions," Review o f Econom ic Studies (1984), pp. 595-614.
Loeb, M. and W. Magat, "A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation," Journal o f Law
and Economics (1979), pp. 399-404.
Seagraves, J., "Regulating Utilities With Efficiency Incentives," Public Utilities Fortnightly
(1984), pp. 18-23.
Smith, V., 'Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Econom ic Review
(1982), pp. 923-955.

Incentive Regulation

139

APPENDIX
Experimental Procedures and Sample Instructions
Most retail markets in developed economies are organized under what has been called the
"posted offer" institution. As we define it for our single seller markets, in this institution the
seller posts in each market period a single take-it-or-leave-it price. Unlike other versions of the
posted offer market, however, the quantity actually traded at that price is determined by the
custom ers—the firm has no right to refuse service to a buyer willing to pay the posted price.
The seller has a record sheet which assigns to each of the possible units of production a
marginal cost, representing the additional cost to him of selling that unit. These MC values are
displayed in Figure 5.
Each period begins with the seller recording on his record sheet the price he wishes to post for
that period. Then the experimenters calculate how many units a population of competitive
buyers would purchase at the seller's announced price. This insures that demand is defined by
the demand curve displayed in Figure 5. After this quantity purchased is announced, the ex
perimenters calculate the seller's trading profits (retail sales revenues less total production
costs) and the bonus payment according to the appropriate incentive mechanism being studied.
All sellers in these experiments were "experienced" in the sense that each had previously par
ticipated in other, unrelated experiments at the University of Arizona.

INSTRUCTIONS
General
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. Various research support
agencies have provided funds for the conduct of this research. The instructions are simple, and
if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you might earn a considerable amount of
money which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
In this experiment, we are going to create a market in which you will be the only seller in a se
quence of market days or trading periods. In this market, you will be the seller of a commodity
to buyers in the market. During each market period, you are free to offer for sale units of the
commodity. Assume that you produce only for immediate sale—that is, this good cannot be
stored. There are no inventories. You will be free to announce to the buyers whatever price
you wish to charge. The details of how to do this will be explained below. However, in any one
trading period you may announce only one price. All the units you sell will be sold at this
price. (Of course, you are free to change your price from one period to the next, if you wish.)
Furthermore, the amount that you sell will be determined by how many units the buyers are
willing to purchase at your announced price. That is, you cannot refuse to sell to anyone who
wishes to buy at your announced price. We turn now to a discussion of how the buyers decide
how many units to purchase.
The Purchasing Decisions of Buyers
In this experiment, we will make the purchasing decisions of the buyers. In doing this, we will
use a purchasing rule designed to simulate the behavior of a market of many buyers, all of
whom make purchasing decisions following a very simple rule: Buyers value the commodity
you are selling. Buyers purchase all the units of the commodity which are profitable to them at
the price you (the seller) have announced.
At this point, we are going to tell you exactly how much the buyers value the commodity. On
the sheet labeled "Buyers Purchasing Rule," we have listed exactly how much this group of
buyers would value each additional unit they purchase from you. This same information is
shown as a graph at the bottom of the page.
Suppose that you posted a price nt 4 - I t
Notice that the buyers value is greater than or
equal to 4 ?8
for units f - g
but less than 4 H -----for units_ 1 — and above.
Therefore, in this example, these buyers would purchase _ fi— units from you. That is, at an
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announced price of ^ . ¿ 5 — you will sell - 8 . units. How many units will you sell at a price of
_fr->Q 7 How about a price of -$Q 7
Where do you get the units of this commodity to sell to the buyers? That is a good question,
and it will be answered in the next section.
SPECIFIC PROFIT INFORMATION FOR THE SELLER
Recall that during each market period you are free to offer for sale units of the commodity at a
specified price. You must announce only one price for all units during a market period, but you
may change your announced price from one period to the next. You have received TWO
sheets in addition to these instructions. One of them is labeled "Summary of Seller's Costs of
Production." On this sheet, the dollar amounts listed in Column (2) are your total costs of pro
ducing the number of units listed in Column (1). The dollar amounts in Column (3) give you
another way of looking at the same information: in Column (3) you see the additional cost to
you of producing the last additional unit of the commodity. Notice, for example, that the total
cost of producing 15 units is equal to the total cost of producing 14 units plus the additional
cost of producing the 15th unit I 84.111 ° S l kO -h 1 . 3 0
>
Each trading period will open when you record on line 1 of your "Seller's Record Sheet" the
price at which you wish to offer units for sale. You will turn your record sheet in to the ex
perimenter who, using the "buying rule" described above, will return it to you after recording
on line 2 how many units the buyers have purchased. Your profits from the trading period are
calculated in two parts: trading' profits and "bonus" profits. Each of these two types of prof
its are computed as follows:
A. Trading Profits If during any trading period you make any sales, you will receive as prof
its the difference between your total sales revenue and your total production costs for the
number of units you sold. Your total sales revenue (line 3 on your record sheet) is simply your
announced price times the number of units the buyers purchase from you (that is, line 1 times
line 2). Your total costs of production are found in Column (2) of the "Seller's Costs of Produc
tion sheet, and are entered on line 4 of your record sheet. Your trading profits for any one
period are then simply calculated as line 3 minus line 4. As an example, notice the column
marked "example period" on your record sheet. Suppose you were to post a price of 4 . Z 6
The buyer's purchasing rule described above states for this test run that buyers would purchase
ji_ u n its at. 4 ? g -. From your cost sheet, you will find that vour total cost of producing
A _u nits is
.. Thus, your total trading profits are 6 * 4 i 0 * 3 4 Z 4 minus m
or OA
B. Bonus Profits. In each trading period, you will receive a "bonus" which depends upon
three numbers: 1) your announced price in the previous period, call this price P (_ j; 2) the
number of units the buyers purchased from you in the previous period, call this quantity Q f
3) your announced price in the current period, call this P(.
In period 1, your bonus payment will be 8 ’ ($4.28-P-j), where P j is your announced price in
period one. For the second and every subsequent period, your bonus payment in that period
will be the same as in the previous period plus the amount Q t_ j x (P ,_j -P (). That is, your
bonus will be increased in each period by the previous period's purchases times the amount by
which you have reduced your announced price since the previous period. Notice that if you
lower your price, your bonus will be the same or larger. If you raise your price, your bonus
will be the same or smaller. We will calculate your bonus for you, but the step-by-step calcula
tions will be shown on your record sheet.
CLOSING COMMENTS
Notice that for any trading period your total profits m ay be positive even if your trading prof
its are negative provided that you have sufficiently large positive bonus profits. (Likewise,
your total profits may be positive even if your bonus profits are not positive, provided that
you have sufficiently large positive trading profits. Finally, before we begin the actual trading,
we will start you off with an initial capital endowment of 6 . 0 0
Are there any questions?
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SUMMARY OF SELLER’S COSTS OF PRODUCTION

(1)
UNIT#

(2)
TOTAL COST
of producing
units

(3)
ADDITIONAL COST
of producing unit

5 . ¡5

4 5 -16

2

¡ o .o 5

410

3

14.70

4. (*5

4

¡910

4 4c

5

0 5 .3 5

4 .1 5

6

3 .7 1 6

3.<t0

7

3 0 .8 0

3 .6 ^

8

3430

3 .4 o

9

3 7 4 6 '

3 .2 . 5

10

4 0 .5 5

310

11

4 3

1

*

.6 0

32-95

12

4 6 .3 0

3 -8 o

13

4900

3270

14

5 I.U )

3 (eO

15

54.10

3 .5 0

16

6 0 ,6 5

2 4 s

17

5 8 .9 6

3 -4 o

18

6/60

Sl ( * 5

19

0,4. Lo

3 .0 0

20

(p8.06

3

21

73 6 0

0 ,5

4 tl5
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BUYERS’ PURCHASING RULE
Unit

1

#---------

Additional Value to Buyers of th e _________Unit

*

(,.o o

2

(s .O O

3

(c?00

4

¿,.00

5

5 70

6

53o

".

7
8

4 .Z &

9

z .~ r o

10

3 55

11

3 3
.

^

12

2.*77

13

320

14

¡.S O

15

.10

16

.

2*0

17

0

18

O

19

O

20

O

21

o

Incentive Regulation

143

BUYERS’ PURCHASING RULE (continued)

__ th Unit
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Example

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

12

13

14

15

16

17

18
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1) Price posted
2)# of units sold
Tradinfl
Profits

3) Total sales revenue
0 x 2)
4)

Total cost of units sold

5) Trading profits
(3 - 4 )

6) Last period's bonus

7) Previous period s bonus
8) This period's price
(line 1)
9)P , - Pt _,
(line 7 - line 8)
Bonus
Profits

10) • of units sold in
previous period
11) Increase in bonus
(9 x 10)
12) This period s bonus
(6 ♦ 11)
13) Total Profits
(5 ♦ 12)

Example
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22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36
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